During periods of flux generated by Tunisia's transition to democracy, all classes of women found the 'political opportunities' to push for change even if they did not necessarily share the same ambition or dream. The mobilisation, contestations, confrontations and struggle of Tunisian women in the post-revolution period alert us to the need to examine the factors behind this activism and the extent of its visibility. It is important to revisit the Tunisian women's movement in order to understand its interaction with other forms of power such as politics, religion, and class; as well as the extent to which such activism is a renegotiation of women's identities and status in post-revolution Tunisia. Indeed, the extent to which the rise of Islamism and its conservative gender ideology can affect feminist movement activities has been one of the main issues of debate. The divide between Tunisian women -secularist and feminist versus Islamist women (Nahdhawiyat) begs to be explored. This divide can be understood as the expected materialisation of binaries that manifestly reveal the hard task of pursuing accountability of feminist movements regarding broader and universal feminist issues of epistemology, agenda, and ethics within the new local context.
Introduction
During periods of flux generated by Tunisia's transition to democracy, all classes of women found the 'political opportunities' to push for change even if they did not necessarily share the same ambition or dream. The mobilisation, contestations, confrontations and struggles of Tunisian women during the post-revolution period alert us to the need to examine the factors behind their activism and the extent of its visibility. It is important to revisit the Tunisian women's movement in order to understand its interaction with other forms of power such as politics, religion, and class; as well as the extent to which such activism is a renegotiation of women's identities and status in post-revolution Tunisia. Indeed, the extent to which the rise of Islamism and its conservative gender ideology can affect feminist movement activities has been one of the main issues of debate. The divide between Tunisian women -secularist and feminist versus Islamist women (Nahdhawiyat) begs to be explored.
This divide can be understood as the expected materialisation of binaries that manifestly reveal the hard task of pursuing accountability of feminist movements regarding broader and universal feminist issues of epistemology, agenda, and ethics within the new local context.
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This article is an attempt to address the binary framings of secular/liberal/elitist/Westernised feminist movements against the reemerging religious/indigenous/ethical and conservative discourse. It aims to shed light on the influence of such opposing frames and their impact on women's struggles for empowerment, and the accountability of both state and non-state actors.
A Historical Background to Emerging Binary Frames
The first Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba led the country after its independence from France in 1956 until his removal from office in 1987 by Zine El Abedine Ben Ali 1 . Bourguiba chose to establish a modern educational and welfare system and promote women's rights rather than build a strong military and involve it in politics. Since 1956, the Personal Status Code 2 banned polygamy, granted equality in divorce proceedings and established a minimum age for and mutual consent in marriage. It granted women's rights to work, move, open bank accounts, and start businesses. Bourguiba insisted on the maintenance of women's rights through social institutions (see Charrad, 1997; 2007) . Still, Bourguiba's regime continued to rely on basic Islamic tenets. While promulgating the CPS, his administration maintained the new was not a break with Islamic heritage, but 'a new phase in Islamic innovation, similar to earlier phases in the history of Islamic thought' (Charrad 2007, pp. 15-19) .
It was the second president, Ben Ali, who promoted women's rights and continued to implement reforms favourable towards women. In 2007, the minimum age of marriage was raised from 15 to 18 for both men and women. In the 2000s Tunisia expanded women's rights with regard to marriage contracts, alimony, and custodial rights over children. These top down policies for women's rights were intended to portray Tunisia internationally as embracing modernity.
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The polarisation between the secularists/liberalists/leftists and the Islamists became visible during the 1980s, and characterised the broader debate on political, economic, legal and social choices and policies. The debate included women's rights and other issues, framed within opposing visions that pitted the Western model of liberation against a conservative one rooted in the Islamic perspective. This divide involved supporters of 'modernity and contemporality' (al-hadathawa-l-mu'asara) on the one hand, and supporters of 'tradition and authenticity ' (al-turathwal-asala) on the other. (Toraifi, 2012) . From the mid-seventies to the early eighties a divide between the state's project and the emerging Islamist movement became apparent. It initially involved universities whose students fascinated by communism and nationalism and those who were divided between those who supported the 1979 Iranian Revolution and Muslim Brotherhood activism in the region.
The divide impacted perceptions of accountability related to political order and social justice. The state accused Islamists of seeking to return to the dark ages, while Islamists attacked the government for uprooting Muslim women from their Islamic identity. The period was marked by repression and trials of several Islamist activists, and a widening social divide between supporters of a modernist view and those calling for the return to the rule of Islam. There was no emergence of an autonomous feminist movement, women's activism remained circumscribed within a national political conflict between the state and the dissident Islamist voices. Leftists were part of this debate; although they were also feared by the ruling party, they had no specific women's or feminist agenda.
(Demonstration organised by the Tunisian Association of Women Democrats (ATFD) for a secular Tunisia. Author Amel Grami (wearing blue). Photo: Lina ben Mheni).
In the 1990s, a new class of female scholars emerged the majority of whom were bilingual or trilingual and either were the product of the new educational system or educated in Europe. Many worked in the State's education and judicial institutions before engaging in political life.
Although some were initially used by the dominant state-led feminism to fight radical Islamic movements, many became active on more than one level. They became increasingly visible in the public sphere through the media and political participation through the ruling party. However, some Thanks to an increasing reception of new approaches to humanities, and a rich and complex debate on religion, women and culture since the late 1990s, a new group of feminist scholars have focused on a reinterpretation of religious texts. This opening has created new venues for Tunisian feminist scholars who initially did not see themselves as 'Islamic feminists'. 6 The deconstruction of religious discourses has been one of several strategies for addressing patriarchy and state feminism as well as contesting men's monopoly of religious discourse and knowledge.
The fact that the Islamic movement politicised religion and appropriated its norms and values influenced feminist scholars of the 1980s to act and react. They endeavoured to counter this discourse and defend themselves against charges of being Western pawns, implementing an imperialist agenda, lacking religious knowledge and legitimacy/authenticity. Some feminists, including myself, started to deconstruct religious discourses, explaining that women's status in Tunisia is related to not only the history of the reformist movement but also the history of Islamic thought in the country, which includes the Tunisian 'brand' of Maliki fiqh.
Being a Member of 'The Tunisian School of Islamic Thought'
As a university student, I was particularly influenced by the work of Nawal Code. 9 These dissenters felt his numerous achievements came at the expense of estrangement from Islamic identity, norms and authentic social values; a view shared by some women who defended the return to an authentic patriarchal order. In this sense, the divide among women reveals an important disparity regarding their status and the impossibility of reaching a unified voice or vision for the future of women in Tunisia.
Scholars like Sillini, Youssef and myself became more visible after the 2011 revolution and we participated in many talk shows, debates, and conferences. After being used by the authoritarian regime as a political tool, the media industry has transformed following the revolution.
Tunisians began to discuss openly and freely: the role of religion (Shari'a law) 10 , the Personal Status Code, secularism, and other theoretical subjects considered fundamental in the process of writing the new constitution as well as building a new civil and democratic state. Female scholars have used all the tools available: mainstream media (press, radio and television), social media (Facebook pages, YouTube, blogs) and publishing to play an important role in clarifying many religious concepts, including some used by Nahdha Party 11 deputies in the Constituent Assembly. 12 By using oral narratives, popular proverbs, life stories, and testimonies we have drawn attention to the forgotten or marginalised female voices that have shaped the history and culture of our society. In short, feminist scholars have helped to refashion the consciousness of the new generation from a gender perspective.
Scholars like Youssef, Sillini and myself are also committed to action in the public sphere and have targeted policy makers, as well as civil society to sensitise them to the high cost of excluding women from social reform and democratisation. As scholar-activists we demonstrate our commitment to accountability in the sense that, 'If being accountable involves being answerable for one's actions, the principle of accountability can be extended from formal to informal institutions and from collective to individual actors' (Cornwall 2017, p. 11) .
Scholars have become increasingly involved in 'action research', merging intellectual and academic activities with militant action where appropriate. Action research is: a participatory, democratic process concerned with developing practical knowing in the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes… It seeks to bring together action and reflection, theory and practice, in participation with others, in the pursuit of practical solutions to issues of pressing concern to people, and more When women engage in the interpretation of religious text and enter the public arena for debate or action, they create a different form of knowledge, using different tools for both its production and dissemination. The post-revolution Tunisian experience led to public acknowledgment of some secular feminist scholars as specialists on religious knowledge. Nonetheless, secularists are not yet ready to concede to the idea of a fully privatised religion, or the total separation between religion and politics. 13 In Egypt, religious scholars at Al-Azhar University have been actively (Zouabi, 2016) . 17 While feminists received regime support from the ruling government before the revolution, following the revolution Islamists saw them as supporters of the state. They treated them as if they are against Islam as a whole. Their objection to wearing the veil in public was considered not only as hostility against Islamic principles but also against democratic ones. 18 Yet for many activists, the fight against fundamentalism was and continues to be a profoundly democratic struggle and inevitably associates them with a regime that has held a similar discourse on women's rights. (equating to 26.3 per cent). Nahdhawi women MPs were a majority among women in the parliament, clearly identifiable by their dress code, unified discourse and attitudes.
Rather than normalising religion as one identity point among many, or as a complex category that often defies easy characterisation, the identification of religion has become a festish and the starting point from which social relations are enacted and from which institutional policy is developed (Beaman 2013, p. 147) . Nahdhawi women defended their party as a civil, 'moderate political party'; however, they made use of their emotional experiences as veiled women. The presence of women on Nahdha's electoral list helped convince people that, against all established perceptions and its proven track record, the Islamist party was 'women-friendly' and believed in women's ability and eligibility to lead and act in all fields. On many occasions, Ghannoushire assured women that his party would neither alter nor want to cancel any of the legal or social achievements of women. He also gave assurances that his party would not challenge the law on polygamy or impose the veil on Ali's policies and gave an impassioned tirade against liberal secular feminists for calling for measures to protect and support single mothers (Kouichi, 2011) . Moreover, she defended the need for their children to receive social and legal protection but pointed out that they should not be treated legally on equal terms with married women. 'We do not want to normalize children outside marriage' (El Ouazghari, 2014) . It is important to note that the En Nahdha party decided to recruit some unveiled women and give them importance. In this sense Nahdha women are not seen as associated with spiritual but with political Islam. Religion is a political agency rather than a religious one.
The long history of the instrumentalisation of women for political reasons has made many Tunisians aware of the real incentive behind the Islamist party's promotion of women. In fact, the party's real attitude towards women was made clear when it suggested reforming of Article 28 of the draft constitution, defining women as 'complementary' to men.
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Thousands of people protested against this move on 13 August 2012, Women's Day in Tunisia.
Many actions such as violence against women activists (Arfaoui and Moghadam 2016, p. 643) , the call for segregation, and attempts by men to control women's behaviour in public, were sufficient evidence that an established lifestyle was being challenged (Sgrena, 2011; Wolf and Lefevre, 2012) . There were nationwide protests against any plan to revoke constitutional rights. As John L. Esposito and François Burgat (2003) pointed out, 'Islamists do not intend to dismantle modernity but to Islamize it, to create an alternative modernity' (Esposito and Burgat 2003, p. 65 ).
Women's Resistance
(Author Amel Grami (left) and a university colleague Mounira Remadi (right) demonstrate with thousands of Tunisians for equality, not 'complementarity' between men and women on National Women's Day in Tunis. 13 August 2012. Photo: Amel Grami.) It is evident that there is a polarisation of issues related to women in postrevolution Tunisia. This is visible in the binarism and dichotomies that emerge from the debates and perception of women in the public and Many Nahdha members were convinced that men and women are equal before God but that they should indeed have different roles within society, especially with regard to family obligations. Others stressed the privileged status given to women in the Shari'a namely through instructions on how mothers, wives and daughters should be by men. Beyond being a linguistic battle, the conflict revealed sharp differences and a tendency to pave the way for the adoption of Shari'a principles that see women as supplementary to men, rather than as full and equal partners.
This binary revealed two frames of reference for women in Tunisia. One a push toward full and legal equality between men and women, and another that sought to establish a softened moral agenda of instituting difference. 7,000 women and men through downtown Tunis to protest against women's perceived complementarity to men in Article 28 (Charrad and Zarrugh 2014, p. 236) . By pushing politicised women to demand their rights from within a religious framework, En Nahdha leaders were obviously trying to alter the discourse on gender equality and give it a meaning compliant with the religious principles of natural inequality.
Luckily, after this huge demonstration on the street and popular pressure, the first women's battle was won and the term 'complementarity' was removed from the constitution, but statements by some women Constituent Assembly members revealed the protest did not end the divide. Accountability was a weapon used by activists who accused those in power of betraying the trust given to them. Any lost right meant further polarisation. Although Ghannoushi declared his party would not change the status of women in Tunisia or the Personal Status Code, some party members opposed parity law, and argued for gender segregation at school. Moreover, some Islamists spoke of overturning the ban on polygamy or tolerating 'religious marriages' that would enable a man to have more than one wife simultaneously or to 'marry' one 'temporarily' (Moghadam, 2016) . From these intersectional identities, they can create a diverse, plural form of feminism that is not shaped by Ben Ali or the media, but by women themselves, through their words, stories, expressions, and interactions with different feminist ideas in online spaces. 'They do not want feminism to be defined at the top, because it does not represent the diversity of women in Tunisia, so they use online spaces to define and conceptualise a new form of grassroots Tunisian feminism' (Mulcahey 2016, p. 63) .
Activists are aware that new media is creating a new sense of accountability toward a public increasingly challenging in its demands for greater transparency in state decisions and policies. Feminists have used these media outlets to make the state more accountable, as well as for outreach in an attempt to adjust negative perceptions of feminism. The post-revolution events helped shape a new female agency rooted in a history of state feminism and shaped by the divide between progressive and conservative societal projects. Throughout this process, the history of feminist action and activism in Tunisia reveals the extent to which the process is dynamic and volatile requiring a continuous rallying of forces, education, and appropriation of language and spaces of decision-making.
Accountability is not necessarily in the hands of the same power structure but is changing location and meaning. Throughout this process, female agency is struggling under the weight of changing structures of power and authority. To emerge fully, it needs an 'enabling environment' and the construction of a collective agency aware of its weight and determinant role in challenging authority. Its liberation is in educating women, in making them aware of the need to change location in terms of framing issues, to transgress the rule of male domination and all its residual forms. This is happening at various levels. For the first time, two elected presidents of Tunisian universities are women and in some university councils, women now hold the majority. There is no doubt that the future of Tunisia is in women's hands. They are aware of the impact of accountability on social relations and on the configurations of power. Tunis, 1996, Islam in Asia, Dar Attalia, Beyrouth, 2006, and  
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